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I. INTRODUCTION
"US plaintiffs' lawyers have revived a dormant 18th-century
law and made it their chief weapon in a 21st-century battle over
corporate responsibility in an age of globalisation." l
* Saad Gul, JD Cum Laude, Wake Forest University School of Law, BA Davidson College.
Law clerk to Chief Judge John C. Martin, North Carolina Court of Appeals and clerk-designate to
Justice Patricia Timmons-Goodson, Supreme Court of North Carolina. I want to thank the ever
helpful staff of the West Virginia Law Review, especially Brienne Greiner and Lisa Gunno for
their assistance and thoughtful suggestions. I would also like to express my particular apprecia-
tion to Professor George K. Walker, Ann Robertson, Jean Holmes, Chris Gyves, Sabeen Mushtaq,
Fahd Gul, and Asad Gul for all their help and patience, and Patrick C. Gallagher, Paula L. Durst
and James S. Crockett, Jr. of Spilman, Thomas, & Battle for their encouragement. This piece is
dedicated to my grandmother, Mrs. Justice Khurshid Gul, who sacrificed much in life for myself
as well as the legal profession. The mistakes and opinions in this piece are mine alone.
I Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power: US Courts Should not Punish Companies for Human
Rights Violations Committed Overseas, FiN. TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 2003, at 12. See also
Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving
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The once dormant eighteenth-century law 2 - referred to in this paper as
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)3 - has, as the above quote indicates, come to life
recently after two centuries of hibernation, and is generating practitioner and
academic debate.4 Even the name is controversial, with commentators referring
to it as the Alien Tort Statute or the Alien Tort Claims Act, depending on
whether or not they believe it creates a cause of action.5
Professor Kenneth C. Randall reported in a 1985 study that he had been
able to locate only twenty-one reported cases brought prior to June 30, 1980 in
which plaintiffs had sought to invoke the ATS.
6 Only two had been successful.
7
Not a single case during the nineteenth century utilized it, and of the twenty-one
he identified, only three predated 1958.8 As recently as 1975, Judge Friendly
referred to the ATS as a "legal Lohengrin" that was "old but little used."9
What has breathed new life into a statute that, like Mark Twain, was
prematurely believed dead ° is the new-found ability to enforce and collect
judgments;1" former Paraguayan policemen tended to be far more judgment
and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law Jurispru-
dence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 103, 108 (2005).
2 Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening
Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE, 1, 10 (2004) ("The question
of whether the Alien Tort Statute provides a cause of action, or provides jurisdiction only for
causes of action established by other instruments, is fundamental. To underscore its importance,
many who believe that the statute provides more than a jurisdictional grant refer to it as the "Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA)," while some of their opponents and some neutral observers settle for
the term "Alien Tort Statute (ATS).").
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."). The Supreme Court refers to the law as the "Alien Tort Statute." See Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
4 Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 4 n. 14 ("The ATS was largely buried, until it was brought back
from near death about two and half decades ago.").
5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets International Law: What's the Sequel to
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INTL L. 77, 77 (2004).
6 See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15-16 (1985).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
10 As recently as 1995, Professor McFadden complained that the Supreme Court was seem-
ingly oblivious to the existence of international law. Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in
United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 4, 15 (1995) ("In the recent practice of the Supreme
Court, international law has dropped from sight with hardly a trace.")
1 Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Account-
able By Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies,
19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 169, 179 (2005) ("It is believed that there has been money collected in
only three of the individual defendant cases: a little more than $1 million from the estate of Phil-
ippine President Ferdinand Marcos, and approximately $1,000 each from General Suarez-Mason
[Vol. 109
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proof than multinational oil corporations.' 2  The Supreme Court noted in its
recent Sosa decision that federal courts needed to weigh the "practical conse-
quences" of ATS litigation in their decision' 3 and singled out corporate and pri-
vate party liability as a particular source of concern under this rubric.'
4
Today, the fifty or so corporations' 5 sued under the statute and the var-
ied locale of the alleged torts read like a veritable Who's Who of international
business. They include: Abercrombie & Fitch, BHP, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Del
Monte, Dole, Drummond Coal, Exxon-Mobil, The Gap, J.C. Penney Co., Levis
Strauss, Nike, Pfizer, Rio Tinto, Shell, Siemens, Southern Peru Copper Corpora-
tion, Target, Texaco, Total, Union Carbide and Unocal. 16 The legal profession
and the public alike seem to have been surprised by the results of an arcane
process by which alien plaintiffs seeking redress for atrocities committed in
distant lands end up in American courtrooms.
17
Judge Bork, perhaps the statute's most prominent critic, wrote that it
seemed preposterous that American courts should rule on cases premised on
actions by foreigners against foreigners on foreign soil.' 8 The Second Circuit
observed that "Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn that vic-
tims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent Bos-
nian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan."' 9
and Kelbessa Negewo. In 2003, $270,000 was collected from one of the defendants in the Roma-
goza case.").
12 Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary International
Law: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 240,
241 (2004) ("The ever-growing prospect of enforceability in U.S. courts dramatically increases
the return on such investment."). See also Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International
Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 433, 437 (2002) ("The number
of cases filed increased rapidly once it became possible to sue corporations, in part because such
defendants are far more likely than individual foreigners to have assets to pay a judgment.").
13 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).
14 Id. at 733 n.21 ("A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual.") (comparing views expressed in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient
consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law), with Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (2d Cir. 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by
private actors violates international law)).
15 See generally LINDA A. WILLETT ET AL., THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (National Center for the Public Interest, 2003).
16 See Robert Vosper, Conduct Unbecoming; No Longer Satisfied With Destroying the Reputa-
tions of Corporations That Get Entangled in Human Rights Abuses Overseas, Activist Groups are
Seeking Retribution in U.S. Courts, CORP. LEG. TIMES, October 2002, at 35. See also Kochan,
supra note 1, at 117.
17 Kochan, supra note 12, at 242 ("Despite evidence of some attention, however, the ATS's
potential impact seems largely unappreciated in the popular press and among popular minds.").
18 Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at AI6.
19 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
3
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More immediately, corporate America worried that if companies lost
cases under various theories of vicarious liability under the statute, it would
become "a major headache for many American companies operating abroad.,
20
Britain's Financial Times warned that the relentless expansion of ATS litigation
was positioning the U.S. litigation system as the "world's civil court of first
resort.",2 1 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce cautioned the ATS provided a venue
for "global venue shopping," with Chamber President Thomas Donohue noting
that the "U.S. is increasingly becoming the jurisdiction of choice for opportunis-
tic foreign plaintiffs. 22 Fortune feared that ATS suits could become the next
23asbestos litigation.
This paper argues that the fears and hype 24 over the ATS25 are greatly
exaggerated. Despite media publicity27 and academic controversy,28 the suits
20 Editorial, To Sue a Dictator, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at A20. See also Kochan,
supra note I at 108 n.22.
21 Thomas Niles, The Very Long Arm of American Law, FIN. TIMES, (London), Nov. 6, 2002 at
15. See also Kochan, supra note 1, at 109 n.22.
22 Tony Mauro, Justices Debate Alien Tort Law, LEG. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 2004, at 8. See also
Kochan, supra note 1, at 109 n.22.
23 Cait Murphy, Is This The Next Tort Trap? Using an Ancient Statute, Lawyers Make Busi-
ness Quake, FORTUNE, June 23, 2003, at § 1, p. 30.
24 For a typically breathless story, see e.g., Daphne Eviatar, Judgment Day: Will an Obscure
Law Bring Down the Global Economy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2003, at D1.
25 See e.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and
Private Compensation, 4 CHL J. INT'L L. 305, 327-28 (2003) (warning that ATS litigation could
trigger large scale disinvestment in developing nations by corporations); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHL J. INT'L L. 457, 458 (2001) (discussing the
toll of ATS litigation).
26 See Harold Hongju Koh, Seperating Myth From Reality About Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263 (2004) (arguing that attacks on the ATS rest on several myths:
that United States courts cannot hold private corporations civilly liable for
torts in violation of international law; that there is a flood of such cases that
would impose liability on corporations simply for doing business in a difficult
country; that statutory amendment or doctrinal reversal is necessary to stem
this flood of litigation; and that domestic litigation is in any event a bad way
to promote higher corporate standards.).
27 Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry and the
GOP Promote the Myth of America's "Lawsuit Crisis," WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2004, at 18, 18
(discussing the prevalence of "fictional lawsuit horror stor[ies]"); see also Marc Galanter, An Oil
Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARiZ. L. REv. 717, 731
(1998) (discussing the hyping of seemingly outrageous cases that are either fictional or distorted);
Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYs. J. 99, 100 (1995) ("The plural of anecdote
is not data."). See also id at 269 ("There are currently very high, multiple barriers to recovery
under the ATS.").
28 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, I, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Gold-
smith, Illegitimacy]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, II, Customary International Law As
[Vol. 109
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themselves have had limited success, and the Supreme Court has left the door
only "slightly ajar" to the recognition of "new" (i.e. post 1789) claims. It ad-
dresses fears that trace the allegedly new found vitality of the statute to the dual
interests of legal elites promoting international law, 29 and other interest groups
who see it as a lucrative lever over large corporations otherwise impervious to
pressure -- in other words as legalized extortion or, in common parlance, a
"shakedown." 30
HI. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS
A. Application of International Law in American Courts
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."' 3' - Justice Gray
From its very inception, the United States has been concerned about its
place among the pantheon of nations.32 The nation "had, by taking a place
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997) [here-
inafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique].
29 See e.g. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 27 (2003)
("The modem expansion of the Alien Tort Claims Act is judicial activism - indeed, moral pre-
sumption - at its highest pitch.").
30 Kochan, supra note 12, at 241. But see Koh, supra note 26, at 258 ("Given the 215 years of
the ATS's history, more than a dozen cases does not constitute a flood. Of these, only three or
four have survived a motion to dismiss, and only one, the Unocal case, is even past the stage of a
summary judgment motion.").
31 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Justice Gray appeared to be reiterating a
stance he had first articulated five years prior to The Paquete Habana:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense,--including not
only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropri-
ately called the "law of nations," but also questions arising under what is usu-
ally called "private international law," or the "conflict of laws," and concern-
ing the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by
reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation,-
-is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and
man, duly submitted to their determination.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). Though neither Hilton nor Paquete Habana dealt
with the ATS, their assessments seemed to embody a rather expansive view of the role of interna-
tional law in U.S. jurisprudence.
32 See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (1776) in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 235 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) ("When, in the Course of human
events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected
them with one another ... a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation.") (emphasis added). But See Eugene Kon-
5
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among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations ....
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound by the law of nations,
"which is a part of the law of the land." 34 Professor Henkin noted that early leg-
islators would have found this observation unexceptional.35 Dean Koh of the
Yale Law School points out that, even apart from the ATS context, "under cur-
rent practice, federal courts regularly incorporate norms of customary interna-
tional law into federal law."
36
The idea is hardly revolutionary- at the time of the birth of the nation, its
courts imported English common law as the germinator for their own, and Eng-
lish common law drew on customary international law as a matter of course.37
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States re-
fers to the English roots of the domestication doctrine in its introduction. 38 Cus-
tomary international law was held applicable in state courts as well.39 Professor
Henkin argues that international law was self-executing and could be applied by
American courts without any intervening step by Congress. 4°
This view is not without its detractors. The late Jack M. Goldklang, an
international law expert for the Department of Justice argued that the very "idea
that international norms can override constitutional acts seems incompatible
with the U.S. system of representative democracy.",41 Several court decisions
torovich, Disrespecting the "Opinions of Mankind": International Law in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261 (2005) (arguing that the historical context of the phrase did not imply
approval of international law). See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Opinion of Mankind, N.Y. SuN,
July 1, 2005, at 9.
33 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 474 (1793).
34 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
35 Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclu-
sion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 868 (1987) ("[E]arly United States courts and legis-
lators regarded customary international law and treaty obligations as part of the domestic legal
system. International law was domestic law.").
36 Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1827
(1998).
37 Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1555-
61 (1984).
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 intro-
ductory note (1987) ("From the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as international
law, was considered to be incorporated into the law of the United States without the need for any
action by Congress or the President, and the courts, State and federal, have applied it and given it
effect as the courts of England had done.").
39 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113 (1784) (holding that the law of
nations is part of the law of Pennsylvania).
40 See Henkin, supra note 37, at 1561 ("International law.., is 'self-executing' and is applied
by courts in the United States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented by Con-
gress.,,).
41 Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between
Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143, 146-47 (1984).
[Vol. 109
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have voiced the same concern. 42 The Goldldang thesis is that far from conced-
ing the paramount nature of customary international law, U.S. courts have long
maintained that domestic laws override conflicting international law, irrespec-
tive of the time of promulgation.43
He cast the landmark decision regarding assimilation of customary in-
ternational law into U.S. law, the Paquete Habana, as upholding this position,
noting that it required U.S. courts to give effect to international law "in the ab-
sence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the
matter." 44 He argued that a necessary inference was that any governmental ac-
tion in the matter would supersede international law, including, in the Paquete
Habana instance, seizure of fishing vessels in contravention of international
law.45
In recent years, several prominent scholars, most famously Professors
Goldsmith and Bradley, have advanced the Goldklang view, alleging that the
current attempts to domesticate international law, primarily through ATS litiga-
tion, are a grotesque twist on the framers' intent.46 They argue that the Constitu-
tion is silent "regarding the domestic legal status" of customary international
law, and that the currently prevalent position that customary international law is
part of federal law "has become orthodoxy only in the last two decades. ' ' 7
Under this view, the ATS represents an extension of regular diversity
jurisdiction to alien cases, though Professors Goldsmith and Bradley concede
that such an interpretation appears inconsistent with the language of the stat-
ute.48 Their concern is that the activist position is a tortured and circuitous at-
tempt to domesticate vague international law in response to the refusal of the
42 See e.g Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., con-
curring) (contesting the constitutionality of the Filartiga holding that federal common law incor-
porates international law), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See also Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 826 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concurring) (arguing
that Filartiga "appears ... to be fundamentally at odds with the reality of the international struc-
ture and with the role of United States courts within that structure").
43 Goldklang, supra note 41, at 144 (quoting Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1959)).
44 Id. at 144-145 (citing In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900)).
45 Id. at 145-146 (citing Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814) (the
President may ignore international law)).
46 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 28, at 821.
47 Id. at 819-823. Bradley and Goldsmith concede that many decisions in the past two centu-
ries have been predicated on customary international law, but argue that they "failed to identify
any theory to support the application of [customary international law]." Id. at 822-23 (citing In re
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
161 (1820); In re The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815); In re The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 297 (1814);
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795).
48 Bradley & Goldsmith, critique, supra note 28, at 851.
7
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political branches to enact the activist's favored treaties. 49 This is of particular
interest to corporations, since the bulk of their abettor liability as defendants is
anchored in customary international law.
The current interpretation of the role of international law in domestic
U.S. jurisprudence was laid down by the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.50 The Court expounded on the role and
interpretation of international law at some length - a fact that in itself under-
scored the importance of the concept to domestic jurisprudence. 5' The Court
would hardly have expended the resources to analyze a concept with no rele-
vance to the nation's jurisprudence. 52 Even Justice White's dissent did not chal-
lenge the essential role of international law.
53
The Sabbatino Court held that "the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropri-
ate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can
then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact."
54
It is important that this underlying standard of a high level of consensus as a
prerequisite to triggering international law would later be laid down by the Su-
preme Court as the benchmark in Sosa for the creation of a cause of action un-
der the ATS.55 In effect this requirement creates a high standard for plaintiffs to
meet and offers an excellent defense option for a corporate defendant litigating
an ATS claim.
Rules derived from international law have been utilized routinely, and
without apparent controversy, in several contexts independent of the ATS by
federal courts at several levels.56 Dean Koh notes that that in addition to domes-
tic land issues,57 federal courts have utilized international law to decide cases
49 Bradley & Goldsmith, Illegitimacy, supra note 28, at 330-31 ("It permits federal courts to
accomplish through the back door of CIL what the political branches have prohibited through the
front door of treaties.").
50 376 U.S. 398, 450-56 (1964). Courts have applied Sabbatino to hold that certain interna-
tional litigation arises under federal common law, which in turn suffices to confer federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003). Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 800 (9th
Cir. 2001). Ironically, the Sabbatino litigants were completely diverse, so the district court had
proper diversity jurisdiction in the first place. Id
51 Koh, supra note 36, at 1833.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
55 Id.
56 Koh, supra note 36, at 1837-38.
57 Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v. Louisiana (The Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case), 470 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1985) (applying customary international law to define the term "his-
toric bay" in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention); United States v. Maine (The Rhode Island and
New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504, 526 (1985) (holding that Long Island and Block Island
Sounds constituted a "juridical bay," and that their waters were therefore internal state waters)).
[Vol. 109
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, * 58 59involving property expropriation, treaty interpretation, and the standards for
treatment of diplomats and prisoners. 6° Statutory interpretation also draws from
the font of international law, for example, U.S. trade law theoretically incorpo-
rates international human rights standards,
6
1 as does Admiralty law. 62
None of these have been particularly exceptional.63 "Once customary
norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate
them into federal common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the
United States by contrary federal directives." 64 Even in the case of apparently
contradictory federal directives, the Supreme Court has long held that an Act of
Congress should never be construed to violate the law of nations if an alterna-
tive interpretation is available.65
In particular, despite the concerns of some critics that international law
is a mechanism for foreign leftist professors, NGOs, and fringe states to ride
58 Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 891-93 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
59 Id. (citing Jhirad v.Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
60 Id. (citing United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 540-41 (D.N.J. 1978)). See also id.
(citing Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (Cabranes, J.), affd in
part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981)).
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (2)
(1987).
62 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 3-1 (2d ed. 1994) (noting
international standards incorporated in admiralty collision rules).
63 Some of the Supreme Court's decisions citing foreign (not international) law during the
2004-2005 cycle did trigger a firestorm. Justice Kennedy's opinions on sodomy proved particu-
larly controversial, and were denounced as upholding "Marxist, Leninist, satanic principles drawn
from foreign law." Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST,
Apr. 9, 2005, at A3. The pressure prompted Congress to introduce bills prohibiting courts from
using foreign or international law in the decision making, and singling out particular justices by
name for ire. See H.R.J. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). See also
Congressman Tom Feeney, Should Americans Be Governed by the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zim-
babwe, or the European Union?, httpJ/www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited Mar
13, 2006). Similarly, Justices Scalia and Thomas have been critical of their colleague's tendency
to look to jurisprudence abroad to support their own reasoning. See, e.g., Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (Scalia, J.). Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari). The problem is that that any advocate looking abroad to
support a particular point will undoubtedly be able to cherry-pick an impressive list of authorities.
As Justice Scalia memorably complained: "In other words, all the Court has done today, to borrow
from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends." Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course, recalling the quip that the
devil can quote scripture to suits his own ends, (WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF
VENICE, act 1, sc. 3, at 56 (Kenneth Myrick ed., New American Library 1965)) this has not pre-
vented the Justices in question from turning abroad when needed. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(recounting the experiences of other democracies). Unfortunately, a full analysis of this contro-
versy is beyond the scope of this paper.
64 Koh, supra note 36, at 1835.
65 Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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rough shod over U.S. legislative practices in an undemocratic manner, Dean
Koh points out that, as the leading power of the past century, the United States
has been exceptionally well-positioned to guide the formation of international
law at all its fonts: state practice, treaties (in which the United States almost
invariably takes a leadership role) and academia. 66 American interests in inter-
national law, inside and outside the alien tort context, remain very well repre-
sented. Indeed, Justice Blackmun complained a decade ago that the Supreme
Court offered insufficient, rather than excessive, deference to international law,
and saw it as an undesirable deviation from past practice.
67
B. The Sources of International Law
The Court [ICJ], whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall ap-
ply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the vari-
ous nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules
of law.68
Despite the perception that international law is a modern innovation,
69
the law of nations in fact dates back to the Romans. 70 "Lacking a global legisla-
ture or court system, international law develops through a complex interaction
of governments, multinational organizations and scholars. 7 1 Critics charge that
this poly-glot process makes it virtually impossible for corporations to comply
66 Koh, supra note 36, at 1854.
67 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 40
(1994) (complaining that in recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court "has shown something less
than 'a decent respect to the opinions of mankind').
68 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 156
U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] available at
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § § 102-03 (1987).
69 Bork, supra note 18 ("My thought was that [the statute] must be a modern excrescence.").
70 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL Law 1 (2d ed. 1993) ( 'The Romans
knew of a jus gentium, a law of nations, which Gaius, in the second century, saw as a law 'com-
mon to all men,' a universal law that could be applied by Roman courts to foreigners when the
specific law of their own nation was unknown and when Roman Law was inapposite.").
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with the law, or even know what it is. 72 "There has been little judicial interpre-
tation of what constitutes the law of nations and no universally accepted defini-
tion of this phrase.,
73
Perhaps the strongest source of international law is international prac-
tice and custom. 74 Custom is recognized by courts when a practice becomes so
universally accepted that it constitutes a norm and is considered obligatory. 75
Commentators often add an additional element - the requirement that states
follow these practices out of a sense of legal obligation, or opiojuris. Congress
has noted that the birth of customary international law is an incremental process,
through which practices become sufficiently established to constitute norms,
which in turn harden into customary international law.76
Customary international law thus results from the "general and consis-
tent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
' 77
From its earliest days, the United States has proactively tried to channel and
influence the evolution of customary international law in line with its own val-
ues.
7 8
In its strongest form, customary international law constitutes jus cogens
norms. 79 Under the Vienna Convention80 "no derogation is permitted" from jus
72 See Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of Na-
tional Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1949 (1997) (book review) (reviewing
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). See also Bork,
supra note 18 ("American individuals and businesses are now without guidance as to what law
may apply to them.... No one knows what actions some courts may hold to be violations of the
law of nations.").
73 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976).
74 For a detailed analysis, See Brigitte Stem, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11
DUKE J. COMp. & INT'L L. 89 (2001) (arguing that custom and accepted practices are the para-
mount source of international law) (quoting and translating PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION Au
DROrr DES TRAITE'S 38 (1972)).
75 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97
(June 27). "[Opinio juris] may be thought of as a solvent that transforms the nitty-gritty of a his-
torical rendition of examples of state practice into a more liquid form: a rule of customary interna-
tional law that may be applied to current problems." Pei-Yun Hsu, Should Congress Repeal the
Alien Tort Claims Act?, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 579, 583 (2004). See also, Janis, supra note 70, at 46.
But See Bork, supra note 18 ('The Ninth Circuit... has fashioned a customary international law
out of international agreements that the U.S. has refused to join, nonbinding agreements, and
political resolutions of U.N. bodies and other nonbinding statements.")
76 H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (Con-
gressional note that though the Torture Victims Protection Act would provide redress to torture
victims, the ATS was needed "to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law.").
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2)
(1987).
78 Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 847 (1989).
79 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
348, 8 IL.M. 679, 699, available at
11
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cogens norms.81 It is the nonderogable nature of jus cogens norms that distin-
guish them from customary international law. 82 Indeed, experts have argued
that there is no way to modify jus cogens norms because any effort to establish
such a change would be void at its inception under the terms of Article 53.83
U.S. Courts recognize the binding nature of jus cogens norms. 84 The Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law reflects this by incorporating the Vienna
Convention terminology in its comments.85
U.S. jurisprudence has evolved to take cognizance of the higher jus co-
gens standards.86 "Since the Vienna Convention was signed in 1969, the con-
cept of jus cogens has figured in nineteen decisions of the federal courts of ap-
http:/untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/I 1 1969.pdf ("[A] peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.")
80 See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
United States has stated that in those instances where it does not recognize the Vienna Convention
as codifying international law, it will treat it as customary law "going forward"). The United
States has stated that it will respect the Vienna Convention to the extent it recognizes it as reflect-
ing customary international law; though it has not ratified it, all three branches of government
reference it. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 433-35 (2004). However, despite "the Vienna Convention's
internationally authoritative status, the Supreme Court has never applied the Convention as U.S.
law." Id U.S. practice and interpretation of the Convention vary from other understandings. Id.
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 cmt.
d-g (1987) and outlining differences, including the fact that U.S. practice and the Vienna Conven-
tion "take radically different approaches to customary international law as an interpretive guide.").
81 Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Imputing Human Rights Obligations On Multinational Corpora-
tions: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again In Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1009, 1023
(2003).
82 See also id.
83 See Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why a Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court
is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBs. 83, 114 (2002).
84 See, e.g.,, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715-16 (9th Cir.
1992).
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k
(1987) ("Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community of states
as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate international
agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is
subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same charac-
ter.").
86 See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Courts seeking to determine whether a norm of customary international law has attained the
status of jus cogens look to the same sources [as for customary international law], but must also
determine whether the international community recognizes the norm as one from which no dero-
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peals. 87 It is illustrative that the Restatement specifies offenses that its authors
believe violatejus cogens norms: genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder, tor-
ture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination.88 This
list is considered neither exhaustive nor closed.89 Indeed, it evolves in response
to changes in international law. 9° On the other hand, American courts have
found only a handful of crimes - genocide, torture, slavery and summary execu-
tion - to constitutejus cogens offenses.91
Professor Stephens points to the instances of punishment violations of
jus cogens offenses as precursors of modern corporate ATS litigation. Dean
Koh explains:
If corporations have rights under international law, by parity of
reasoning, they must have duties as well. As history and prece-
dent make clear, corporations can be held liable in two ways,
particularly when they are involved in jus cogens violations.
First, corporations can be held liable as agents of the state
committing what Andrew Clapham calls 'complicity offenses',
namely, acting under color of state law or in concert with state
actors. Second, it has always been true that private actors, in-
cluding corporations, can be held liable under international law
if they commit certain "transnational offenses" - namely, hei-
nous offenses that can be committed by either a public or a pri-
vate entity."
The most notable instances of corporate violations of international law
were highlighted in the post World War II trials of defendants convicted of war
crimes as accomplices, including German industrialists who sold poison gas to
the Nazis knowing the purpose to which it would be put,93 and German pharma-
87 A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1475, 1494 (2003).
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987).
89 Id. at § 702 cmt. a; see also Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Imputing Human Rights Obligations
on Multinational Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1009, 1022-23 (2003).
90 Bridgeford, supra note 81, at 1022-23; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. a (1987).
91 See Laura Bowersett, Doe v. Unocal: Torturous Decision for Multinationals Doing Business
in Politically Unstable Environments, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 361, 372 (1998); see also id. at 1023
("Slavery, genocide, torture, and summary execution constitute this narrow subset of offenses.").
92 Koh, supra note 26, at 265 (footnotes omitted).
93 Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machan: "The Door Is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Liti-
gation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 533, 559 n.127 (2005) (citing The Zyklon B Case (Trial
of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93 (Brit. MI. Ct.
1946)).
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ceutical executives who supplied vaccines to the Nazis, knowing that the latter
would use them to conduct medical experiments on concentration camp in-
mates.94 They were sentenced under the contemporaneous understandings of
abetting or leadership theories.
This understanding also underlies modern treaty law,95 such as the
founding statute of the International Criminal Court, which imposes liabilities
on an individual who "aids, abets or other otherwise assists in the commission
of a crime." 96 Skeptics point out however, that the United States has not ratified
many of the treaties and declarations that are sought to be a source of the law,
and that even ratification did not reflect self-executing intent.97
This concern - that an expansive international law derived from a m6-
lange of declarations, resolutions and assorted treaties could generate endless
causes of action and thus runaway ATS litigation - seems to have been ad-
dressed directly in Sosa, which held that the plaintiff, Alvarez, could not estab-
lish that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPR) were intended to create
enforceable obligations.98 Not only did this effectively cut off the UDHR and
ICPR as fonts of potential causes of action, but it gave rise to the inference that
any cause of action recognized under the ATS must be far more concretely es-
tablished in international practice than lofty aspiration on endless reams of pa-
per.
Finally, the writings of international scholars are considered to be a
source of law.99 Though savaged by both commentators l°° and some judges, 10'
94 Id. at 559 n. 127 (citing United States v. Krauch, VIII Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 101081, 1169-72 (1952)).
95 Id. at 559 n.128 (noting that the Torture Convention criminalizes any act "that constitutes
complicity or participation in torture." (quoting Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113,
113)).
96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 art. 5 § 3(c)
(1998) (United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 LL.M. 998 (1998); see also
Stephens, supra note 93, at 559.
97 Bork, supra note 18; see also Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S.
Alien Tort Claims Act for Violations of Customary International Law During the Third Reich,
1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167, 186 (1997).
98 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
99 In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (explaining that in order to ascertain
customary international law, courts must look to the "customs and usages of civilized nations;
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators"). But see id. at 720 (Fuller,
J., dissenting) (stating that it was "needless to review the speculations and repetitions of the writ-
ers on international law.... Their lucubrations may be persuasive, but are not authoritative").
100 See Bork, supra note 18 ("There could be no more anti-democratic way to make interna-
tional law than to rest it upon the opinions of professors. That process is not only anti-
constitutional and undemocratic, it is class oriented. The professoriat in social matters is well to
the left of the American public ... ").
[Vol. 109
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the unique role of scholars has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Smith10 2 and The Paquete Habana,10 3 as well as by different
international documents.
Critics charge that the cacophony of academic debate would quickly
confuse judges and juries in ATS cases, who "would be swamped in citations to
various distinguished journals of international legal studies, but would be left
with little more than a numbing sense of how varied is the world of public inter-
national 'law." ' °4 Addressing these concerns the Supreme Court set an ex-
tremely cautionary standard in Sosa, quoting The Paquete Habana, to note that
it would be appropriate, impliedly in limited circumstances, to turn to scholarly
materials as indicia, if not a source, of law, which U.S. jurisprudence has "long,
albeit cautiously, recognized," to the extent they are offered to delineate "what
the law really is" and not for academic ruminations "concerning what the law
ought to be."'
10 5
Proponents of the statute point out that in sifting through the gravitas
and authoritative sounding opinions of differing international law professors,
judges perform the same function in ATS cases as they do in virtually any com-
plex litigation entailing expert testimony.'°6 Furthermore, in the absence of a
general consensus among experts, courts have declined to find the existence of a
norm, a necessary predicate for building an ATS suit.°7 The advantage of any
doubt in such cases invariably accrues to corporate defendants.
Finally, international law has its own gap-filler provisions, cobbled to-
gether from general sources of law, natural law, and accepted practices of na-
tions; these apply only when primary sources, such as international law or trea-
ties, do not offer specific guidance on the controversy at issue.
0 8
101 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concur-
ring) ("Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to argue over what is or
what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations .... Plaintiffs would troop to court mar-
shalling their 'experts' behind them. Defendants would quickly organize their own platoons of
authorities. The typical judge or jury would be swamped in citations....").
102 United States v. Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) ("What the law of nations on this
subject is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
laws ... ").
103 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (noting courts applying international law may refer to
the work of "jurists and commentators... for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is").
104 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
105 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733-34 (2004) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. at 700).
106 Stephens, supra note 71, at 487.
107 Id. at 488.
108 See Pei-Yun Hsu, Should Congress Repeal the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J.
579, 583 (2004) ("These nonconsensual sources of law function as gap fillers since there are some
gaps when only applying treaties and customary international law.").
15
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I[. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Had General Pinochet come to the United States instead of to England,
he most likely would have been sued, not arrested. 109
Plaintiffs filing suit under the ATS must establish that "(1) they are
aliens, (2) they are suing for a tort, and (3) the tort violates 'the law of na-
tions."'110 Professor Stephens, a supporter of an expansive ATS interpretation,
argues that the Constitution clearly grants Congress the mandate to "define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations" ' and that an expansive interpretation of the ATS can be
seen as executing this power. 112
This power was invoked in a number of early cases, including Talbot v.
Janson," 3 where "the court found the defendant liable for aiding in the unlawful
capture of a neutral ship,"'1 4 and Henfield's Case,115 which noted that "'commit-
ting, aiding, or abetting hostilities" in violation of international law would entail
liability." F6 Other offenses have included piracy 17 and attacks on diplomats. 1 8
In analyzing these cases, Professor Steinhardt points out that "Congress
has criminalized a variety of offenses against the law of nations, and U.S. courts
have exercised criminal jurisdiction over violations of international law since
the founding of the nation."'1 9 Against this backdrop, providing a civil remedy
for such violations would not be wholly unforeseeable. Corporate defendants
became increasingly amenable to suits under the ATS as the result of three
landmark decisions in the waning decades of the twentieth century. The deci-
sions shaped, over several decades, the general contours of modern ATS juris-
prudence.
109 Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2002).
110 Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental
Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 5 (2003).
II U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
112 See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish.. . Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449 (2000)
("Properly understood, the Offenses Clause grants Congress exceptional powers to incorporate
international law into federal law ... ").
113 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 156-157 (1795).
114 Stephens, supra note 93, at 560.
115 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
116 Stephens, supra note 93, at 559 (quoting Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1103).
117 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 153 (1820).
118 See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 120, 120, 124 (1784).
119 Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and
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First, the Second Circuit revived the long moribund statute with its
landmark ruling in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,120 which held that torture by an offi-
cial violated the laws of nations, and created a cause of action under the ATS. 1
2
Dean Koh described Filartiga as the Brown v. Board of Education of transna-
tional public litigation.122 The decision was generally well received: "Although
one opinion from a splintered panel of the District of Columbia Circuit largely
rejected Fildrtiga, its views were not adopted by any other courts and were re-
jected by most commentators.' 23
Second, nearly twenty years later, in Kadic v. Karadi6,124 the Second
Circuit found that some international norms were applicable to private actors as
well as state individuals. 125 Even more ominously for corporations, Karadik
held that private actors could be held responsible for torts in violation of interna-
tional law, either as accomplices, or directly as tortfeasors. 126 Other circuits
would eventually follow the Second Circuit's lead. 27
Third, in a 1996 case against Unocal, the court explicitly recognized
that corporations could be held civilly liable for violations of international law
in conjunction with state authorities. 128 One commentator noted that the deci-
sion was "unprecedented," since a federal court had never before held a private
corporation liable under the ATS for a violation of international law.'
129
The hype may have far outpaced the reality. "Over the life of the stat-
ute, approximately 120 cases have raised claims; 20 of those - all but 2 unsuc-
120 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
121 Id.
122 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
123 Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 169, 175 (2004).
124 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
125 Id. at 241-43.
126 Id. at 239 ("[C]ertain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by
those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.").
127 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Thus, under Kadic,
even crimes like rape, torture, and summary execution, which by themselves require state action
for ATCA liability to attach, do not require state action when committed in furtherance of other
crimes like slave trading, genocide or war crimes, which by themselves do not require state action
for ATCA liability to attach. We agree with this view and apply it below to Plaintiffs' various
ATCA claims."), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (2003), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
403 F.3d 708 (2005).
128 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
395 F.3d 932, 962 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment for defendants on ATS
claims of "forced labor, murder, and rape," but affirming grant of summary judgment for defen-
dants on ATS claim of torture), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (2003), opinion vacated,
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (2005).
129 H. Knox Thames, Forced Labor and Private Individual Liability in U.S. Courts, 9 MICH. ST.
J. INT'LL. 153, 153 (2000).
17
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cessful - predated Fildrtiga.'130 Even after Fildrtiga, "most [cases] have been
dismissed, most often for failure to allege a violation of international recognized
human rights, for forum non conveniens, or because of the immunity of the de-
fendant..... Yet, despite this less than scintillating record, "controversy over
this line of litigation has exploded in the past few years."
132
A. Pre-Sosa: Jurisdiction Only, or Jurisdiction Plus Cause of Action?
[I]t is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of ac-
tion before a private plaintiff [can] be allowed to enforce prin-
ciples of international law in a federal tribunal. 1
33
The fountainhead' 34 for much of the literature arguing that the ATS does
not grant a cause of action is Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic.'35  In that opinion, Judge Bork held that plaintiffs could not
claim for damages for violations of international law under the statute, since it
did not state an independent cause of action. 136 In his view, the statute conferred
limited subject matter jurisdiction confined to the violations of the law of na-
tions acknowledged in 1789.137
This view is premised on the basis that at the time of the statute's en-
actment "[i]n 1789, the Law of Nations was restricted to safe conduct, rights of
130 Stephens, supra note 123, at 177.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concur-
ring).
134 Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterritorial-
ity and the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671, 673 n.6 (2003) ("Scholarship regarding
the ATS is vast. Much of it focuses on the debate raised by the concurring opinion of Judge Bork
in Tel-Oren.").
135 726 F.2d at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 810.
Appellants' argument that they may recover damages for violations of interna-
tional law is simple. International law, they point out, is part of the common
law of the United States. This proposition is unexceptionable. But appellants
then contend that federal common law automatically provides a cause of ac-
tion for international law violations, as it would for violations of other federal
common law rights. I cannot accept this conclusion.
Id. (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 813-14 ("What kinds of alien tort actions, then, might the Congress of 1789 have
meant to bring into federal courts? According to Blackstone, . . . 'the principal offences against
the law of nations, animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, [were] of three
kinds; 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and 3. Piracy.'
One might suppose that these were the kinds of offenses for which Congress wished to provide
tort jurisdiction for suits by aliens in order to avoid conflicts with other nations.") (citation omit-
ted) (alteration in original); see also Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 82.
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ambassadors, issues of prize, and prohibitions against piracy."'' 38 Any expansion
would require a fresh grant by Congress.' 39  As recently as 2003, Judge
Randolph held to this line of reasoning in his concurrence in Al Odah v. United
States. 140 Professor Casto went so far as to say that in the light of the historical
evidence, any position that "the statute create[d] a federal statutory cause of
action [was] simply frivolous.'
4 1
This view posits the statute as strictly jurisdictional, and would require a
specific congressional grant as a prerequisite to creating a cause of action. 1
42
The defendant's position in Sosa asserted this position as a ground of his de-
fense, an assertion in which he was supported by the Bush Administration. 1
43
Though Judges Bork and Robb had advanced this reasoning in Tel-Oren and Al-
Odah, at the time of Sosa their "views [had not been] adopted by any other
courts and [had been] rejected by most commentators."'
144
Opponents argued that such an interpretation would virtually eviscerate
the statute, rendering the exercise of its enactment a pointless exercise in futil-
ity. 145 Their view - one that apparently gained some traction with the majority
in Sosa - emphasizes that a somewhat broader reading would have been more
compatible with the drafter's contemporaneous understanding of the statute. 146
In particular, the Sosa majority seemed to be swayed by the "1795 opin-
ion of Attorney General William Bradford, who was asked whether criminal
prosecution was available against Americans who had taken part in the French
plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone." 147 Though equivocal on the
issue of criminal liability, the Attorney General had been emphatic that civil
liability was clearly available as a remedy option:
138 Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 77.
139 Id. at 82.
140 321 F.3d 1134, 1145-50 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
141 William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 467, 479-80 (1986).
142 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring).
143 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (noting that both the defendant and the
Administration argued that "there is no relief under the ATS because the statute does no more than
vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor authorizing the courts to recognize any
particular right of action without further congressional action"); see also, Igor Fuks, Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate
Liability, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 112, 120-21 (2006).
144 Stephens, supra note 123, at 175.
145 Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise:
Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INTL L. 3, 66 (2003).
146 See Stephens, supra note 123, at 175.
147 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721 (citing I Op. Att'y. Gen. 57, 59 (1795)).
19
Gul: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: An As
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
"But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a
civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues
for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of
the United States ....
Though emphasized by the Sosa Court, the 1795 opinion was hardly
unique. 149 Even before Sosa, at least four Circuits - the Second, 50 Fifth,' 5 '
Ninth 52 and Eleventh 53 - had come around to the view that the statute granted
both jurisdiction and a cause of action 5"4 However, this view was far from uni-
form. 155 In the wake of Sosa, Judge Bork's view of the ATS as merely jurisdic-
tional is effectively "a dead letter - unless revived by Congress.' 56 Conversely,
the fears of commentators 57 and judges 158 that the recognition of causes of ac-
tion in the absence of explicit congressional grants would lead to courts cherry
picking law and "pernicious results"'' 59 seem to have been sidelined - for now.
148 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721 (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 59) (omissions in original).
149 See, e.g., 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907) ("I repeat that the statute[] thus provide[s] a
forum and a right of action.").
150 Kadic v. Karadlid, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995).
151 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 197 F.3d
161 (5th Cir. 1999).
152 In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cit.
1994).
153 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830
(1996) (statute "provid[es] both a private cause of action and a federal forum where aliens may
seek redress for violations of international law").
154 Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d 847-48; Bridgeman, supra note 110, at 5 n.21.
155 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th
Cir. 1992) (disagreeing, in dicta, with the government's position that § 1350 does not provide a
cause of action); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the ATS is a "jurisdictional statute only"); Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical
Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343, 348 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that the ATS solely jurisdic-
tional, and does not provide a cause of action); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1378
(W.D.N.Y. 1985) (ATS is merely jurisdictional and does not create a cause of action).
156 Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 82 (speculating that corporate liability under the ATS could lead
to asbestos-like litigation and the discouragement of foreign investment).
157 Id. at 79.
158 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concur-
ring).
159 See Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 79 ("In ATS litigation, lower federal courts have unfortu-
nately adopted a mix and match approach to the choice of law ... ").
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B. Post-Sosa: The Supreme Court Giveth and Taketh Away'
6°
"In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action, the reasonable inference from the histori-
cal materials is that the statute was intended to have practical
effect the moment it became law."'
16'
Commentators viewed the Supreme Court's Sosa judgment as a species
of limited "jurisdiction plus" analysis: the statute created a cause of action, al-
beit limited, in addition to conferring jurisdiction. 162  Furthermore, and
"[plerhaps most importantly, Sosa leaves open the possibility of creating a
common law cause of action in connection with international law."'163 Though
pivotal for the purposes of ATS litigation, the principle itself was hardly an in-
novation; over a century ago, the Supreme Court had already noted in The
Paquete Habana that international law could evolve "by the general assent of
civilized nations."' 64
Though categorically 165 "reject[ing] [the] argument that the statute was
in effect stillborn in the absence of separate authorizing legislation,"' 66 Sosa
rejected the idea that the statute created a new cause of action, deeming such a
reading "implausible."' 167 In effect, the Supreme Court split the difference be-
tween the Bork and activist viewpoints.168 It held that, "Although we agree the
statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the
jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category de-
160 See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111, 118 (2004) (noting that
"[I]ike Santa Claus, the [Sosa] opinion brought something for everyone.").
161 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
162 Fuks, supra note 143, at 121.
163 Id.
164 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900).
165 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719 ("[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not
pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress
or state legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action. . . for the
benefit of foreigners.").
166 Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modem Foundations for Aiding and Abetting Li-
ability under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARiz. L. REv. 805, 820 (2005).
167 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
168 Both sides claimed victory. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Foreign Turf Human Rights Suits
Against Corporations Hinge on How Open the Door Is, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 20 (Human
rights advocates and anti-ATS groups alike are holding Sosa out as a victory for their side.). Ac-
tivists emphasized that the Supreme Court left the door ajar for additional claims. Id. Skeptics
focused on the admonition any new cognizable claims must be analogous to the designated 1789
offenses. Id Judge Bork was far less nuanced, and expressed profound disappointment: "in here
was considerable hope when the Supreme Court agreed to review a decision by the Ninth Circuit
in Sosa .... Surely, the Court would rescue us from the disfigurements worked upon the statute
by lower federal courts. That hope was dashed." Bork, supra note 18.
21
Gul: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: An As
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
fined by the law of nations and recognized at common law."' 69 The Court
stressed that no specific grant of jurisdiction was required "because torts in vio-
lation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law
of the time." 170
Even more importantly, the Court seemed amenable to recognizing
post-1789 torts, albeit very cautiously: "the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.'
171
"Thus, the ATCA will recognize a cause of action beyond the list of violations
of safe conducts, piracy, and ambassador law, so long as it is accepted by the
international community and defined with the same degree of specificity that
those violations had been."'
' 72
This holding not only rejected the "jurisdiction only" argument, but
seemed to posit the Court on the verge of recognizing further international torts,
thereby opening the floodgates to a torrent of newly recognized claims. Instead,
the Court stepped back from the precipice by stressing that the statute would
include only a handful of torts within its ambit - a "relatively modest set of ac-
tions... very limited set of claims"' 173 - those analogous to the widely accepted
violations of the laws of nations of 1789.174
Noting that there were good reasons for a restrained approach, 75 Sosa
directed federal courts evaluating ATS suits to "require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.'' 176 Explaining the standard,
the Court held that "the creation of a federal remedy" under the ATS required a
violation of "a norm of customary international law so well defined" as to be
binding, rather than aspirational. 1
77
The Court cited, with apparent approval, several circuit cases that had
delineated a similarly high threshold. 178 This test was so stringent that even
Alvarez himself, the plaintiff before the Supreme Court, could not demonstrate
169 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
170 Id. at 714.
171 Id at 729.
172 Fuks, supra note 143, at 122.
173 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
174 Id.
175 See Diskin, supra note 166, at 820 (noting, inter alia, the Erie doctrine, the lack of a specific
Congressional grant, and potential foreign policy implications).
176 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
177 Id. at 757.
178 Id. at 732 (citing, with apparent approval In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, univer-
sal, and obligatory.") and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the limits of the ATS be defined by "a handful of hei-
nous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.").
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that his grievance reflected a violation of an established norm: "Whatever may
be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect
world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having
the specificity we require."' 179 After this tantalizing beginning, the Supreme
Court stopped short of delineating the contours of the doctrine, saying only that
the determination required an individualized assessment.
80
Customary international law is often an unwritten doctrine of uncertain
contours.' 8  Therefore, if the norms equate to customary international law,
much uncertainty and litigation may be expected. The only concession the cryp-
tic decision 1 2 made to disappointed observers 83 was a strong hint that the issue
would be revisited in the near future. 84 In the interim, with the recognition of
norms an apparently open question, much uncertainty, jockeying, and court con-
fusion 85 may be expected.
IV. CORPORATE LITIGATION UNDER THE STATUTE
"The next big test will be whether the Alien Tort Claims Act can be
used against companies as well as individuals"'
' 86
The idea of holding corporations liable for violations of international
law is hardly new. As this paper noted earlier, a number of German businessmen
were convicted at Nuremberg under theories of accomplice or abettor liabil-
ity.'87 They included steel magnate Friedrich Flick for the use of slave labor,188
179 Sosa at 738.
180 Id. at 732-33.
181 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 28, at 858-59.
182 Some guidance might be available from earlier decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (delineating the standard for determining whether the torts
alleged, such as piracy, are law of nations violations).
183 See, e.g., Grace C. Spencer, Comment, Her Body Is A Battlefield: The Applicability of the
Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico, 40 GoNZ. L. REV. 503,
523 (2004-05) (calling the Sosa decision "dangerous because it lacks internal coherence .... [i]t
fails to present clear criteria for determining specific human rights norms that would constitute a
law of nations.").
184 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 ("We would certainly consider [Amici proposals] ... in an ap-
propriate case.").
185 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)("While
it would have been unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if the Supreme Court
had created a bright-line rule that limited the ATCA to those violations of international law clearly
recognized at the time of its enactment, the Supreme Court left the door at least slightly ajar for
the federal courts to apply that statute to a narrow and limited class of international law violations
beyond those well-recognized at that time".).
186 Editorial, To Sue a Dictator, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at 26.
197 Diskin, supra note 166, at 825.
188 United States v. Flick, "The Flick Case," VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1952).
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and the Zyklon B Case,' 89 where the defendants sold poisonous gas to the Nazis
knowing that that it would be used to kill Jews in the concentration camps.190
"In all of the above cases, international tribunals demonstrated that
those who aid and abet international law violations have themselves violated
international law as accessories and are therefore guilty."' 91 Therefore, there is
some historical precedent to extend ATS liabilities to corporations. This is criti-
cal because a plaintiff suing under the ATS must allege a violation of the law of
nations to invoke the statute.192
Some commentators such as Hufbauer and Mitrokostas have disputed
the validity of the Nuremberg comparison, arguing that the German business-
men were convicted on grounds of individual criminal, not corporate civil, cul-
pability. 93 However, the argument seems self-defeating.194 Logic would seem
to dictate that if corporations can be found criminally liable for violation of in-
ternational law, civil liability seems to require a substantially less dramatic leap
of faith.195 And if the individual criminal conduct was carried out within the
scope of employment with a corporation, it would follow that the latter should
be at least civilly liable for the wrong-doing from which it had profited.
In particular, the literature in the field recognizes that both criminal and
civil penalties can attach in such situations; 1% if anything, the elements for
criminal liability are harder to establish than the elements for civil liability.1
97
Seen in this light, Nuremberg would seem to be a stronger, not a weaker prece-
"89 The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, UNITED NATIONS WAR CIMES
COMMISSION, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (Brit. MI. Ct. 1946).
190 Diskin, supra note 166, at 825.
191 Id.
192 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ("A threshold question on the
jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates the law of nations."). See also Amlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
193 GARY C HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MrRoKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE OF 1789 45-46 (2003).
194 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961). In Callanan, Justice Frankfurter
explained why crime acting in concert was more dangerous than sole crime: "Concerted action
both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases
the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group
association ... makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one crimi-
nal could accomplish."
195 Koh, supra note 26, at 266 ("Nor does it make sense to. argue that international law may
impose criminal liability on corporations, but not civil liability.").
196 See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate
Crime Enforcement, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 541 (2004) ("[W]e have both criminal and civil
enterprise liability as an option for firms whenever an agent on the job commits a crime on behalf
of the firm.").
197 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 1477, 1534 (1996). For a historical account of the evolution of corporate accountability in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A
Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393 (1982).
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dent for corporate ATS liability than Hufbauer and Mitrokostas argue. 198 In the
domestic context, Judge Learned Hand had noted that corporate civil and crimi-
nal liability could attach to the same conduct, and both would be encompassed
under the concept of respondeat superior.199
Indeed, corporate civil responsibility for a myriad of activities has been
laid down in a number of international treaties concerning slave or child la-
bor,2°° hazardous waste,201 nuclear accidents, 20 2 environmental disasters result-
ing from oil spills203 or bribery.2°4 An argument could be made that these con-
ventions show the ability of developed nations (the homes of most multi-
national corporations) to address corporate responsibility without the necessarily
ad hoc basis of ATS litigation. On the other hand, Dean Koh points out that
ATS critics face a logical disconnect here: "So how can it be that corporations
can be held responsible under international law for their complicity in oil spills,
but not for their complicity in genocide? How can corporations be held liable
under European law for anticompetitive behavior, but not for slavery?, 20 5
So far U.S. Courts have refused to exempt corporations from liability
under the law of nations.206 Rejecting the submissions of prominent scholars
198 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[A] considerable body of United States and international precedent indicates
that corporations may be liable for violations of international law, particularly when their actions
constitute jus cogens violations.").
199 United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
2W See Declaration Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization
at its 204th Session, at 10, 16, 37, 41 (November 1977), available at
http:/www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited February 25th,
2006).
201 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal arts. 4(3), 9(5), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57, 132, 137.
202 See, e.g., Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nu-
clear Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255.
203 See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 973 U.N.T.S. 3.
204 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, at art. 3 (Dec. 17, 1997), available at http'./www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340
,en_2649_34855_2017813_1_1_1_l,00.html ("The bribery of a foreign public official shall be
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. The range of penalties
shall be comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public officials and shall,
in the case of natural persons, include deprivation of liberty sufficient to enable effective mutual
legal assistance and extradition.").
205 Koh, supra note 26, at 265. The existence of corporations as legal entities with rights is long
established. See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (corporations are "citi-
zens" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
778-79 n.14 (1978) (upholding corporation's right to spend money to influence referenda).
206 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing to
dismiss suit on the basis of defendant's corporate status); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co.,
256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding corporate liability under the TVPA).
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James Crawford and Christopher Greenwood who argued for such immunity,
one court noted that they had not been able to cite a single U.S. case as authority
to buttress their bland assertions. 2 7 Another court noted that "[n]o logical rea-
son exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability
for universally condemned violations of international law...."
208
Though critics have charged that the gradual "jurisdiction creep" 2°9 of
the ATS has triggered "the spate" of lawsuits under the act that now allegedly
plague corporate defendants,210 there is some historical support for the idea that
at the time of the statute's enactment, courts did in fact envision accomplices in
the violation of international law as entailing some sort of accomplice liabil-
ity.211 This strand of accomplice liability has survived in the two centuries
since.212 What is harder to determine is its precise parameters - though, as noted
above, this confusion works to the advantage of defendants rather than plain-
tiffs.
In the wake of Sosa, the critical questions are: what torts will meet the
ATS threshold, and to what extent will corporations will be held liable as abet-
tors?213 So far the Supreme Court's guidance is cryptic at best: "The claim must
W7 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
208 Iwanowa v. Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999). See also Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Human Rights Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United States
Civil Litigation System, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2211, 2237 (2004) ( "This corporate immunity argu-
ment seems absurd, in light of the fact that the Supreme Court's sole ATCA decision, before the
issuance of Sosa in 2004, was brought by a corporation against the Argentine government.").
W9 Aiding, abetting and complicity seemed to be taking hold in pre-Sosa ATS litigation. See,
e.g., Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (defendant's alleged complicity in
murder of archbishop); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(involving claims of abuse and torture at detention facilities); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 127-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (allegations defendants aided and abetted the Nazi plunder
of plaintiff's bank accounts).
210 Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AF. 81, 93 (1999). But see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial
Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Erod-
ing Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 992-994 (2003)
(noting that "the claims of the alleged 'litigation explosion' are exaggerated .... [studies show]
that any trend towards litigation growth has been stabilizing if not reversing .... the overall U.S.
litigation rate ... is not higher than it has been during other periods of American history, and, per
capita, is in the same range as other industrialized countries' rates.").
211 Stephens, supra note 93, at 558 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 66-73 (Dublin, The Company of Booksellers 1775)).
212 See, e.g., First Natl City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
622-23 (1983) (reiterating the principle that international law is part of American law and consid-
ering the appropriateness of piercing the corporate veil under principles of international law and
federal common law).
213 See Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2003),
affd in part, vacated in part, 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that in most ATS cases
involving corporate defendants, the complaint alleges complicity in what are "actions taken by
state entities."). See also Kochan, supra note 1, at 117 (noting that recent holdings that corpora-
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meet a threshold level of acceptance in the international community, and the
claim must have specificity comparable to the original set of limited viola-
tions.
21 4
Some commentators read this as effectively shutting the door to corpo-
rate abettor suits: "In a pre-Sosa court room, aiding and abetting may have
qualified as an actionable claim under a basic customary international law
analysis. Post-Sosa, however, it is apparent that a far greater degree of specific-
ity will be required to support the creation of a federal remedy for a new
claim."
21 5
Professor Kontorovich has argued that Sosa requires any new causes of
action to share six specific characteristics with piracy, and that virtually no torts
can satisfy this test.21 6 Professor Dodge challenges this view as irreconcilable
with the text of Sosa.2 17 Justice Scalia pointed out that Sosa's own standard
seemed to incorporate the Ninth Circuit's "specific, universal and obligatory"
test wholesale, yet arrived at a different conclusion while applying it.218 He dis-
missed the "door ajar" test as an "illegitimate lawmaking endeavor.,
219
Academics 220 and courts221 alike have struggled to comprehend the Sosa
holding. In part the holding may simply be a reflection of the amorphous nature
of international law. Critics have long argued that international law in general is
far too nebulous 222 to offer corporations clear bright line rules for conduct; one
commentator complained that it provided a "a vague223 and evolving standard,
which defines neither the bounds of acceptable action nor inaction., 224 The
tions could be liable under theories of customary international law spurred the current wave of
ATS litigation).
214 Fuks, supra note 143, at 122.
215 Virginia Monken Gomez, Note, The Sosa Standard: What Does It Mean For Future ATS
Litigation? 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 499 (2006).
216 See generally, Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004).
217 William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System
After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 94 n. 40 (2004) (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).
218 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747-48 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
219 Id. at 750.
220 See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term--Leading Cases, 118 HARv. L. REV. 446, 454-55
(2004) ("the Court's analysis offers few practical cues to lower courts that must perform the in-
quiry").
221 In re South African Apartheid Litig. v. Citigroup, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(complaining of the lack of guidance).
222 Gomez, supra note 215, at 143 ("Ultimately, the corporate argument is not very convincing,
as actors in any legal regime must learn to exist with some degree of uncertainty.").
223 Vagueness of obligations can constitute a defense in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Win-
ters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
224 Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer?, 42
WM. & MARY L. RaV. 619, 637 (2000).
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complaint is that the international law provides no clarity in assessing the liabil-
ity of corporations, and corporations are thus vulnerable to virtually limitless
lines of attack.225
However, an alternative reading may be that international law sets a
high threshold for complicity or abetting offenses.226 For example, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has required that the assis-
tance must be "direct and substantial. ' 227 Similarly, in another case, it noted that
the conduct needed to consist of "practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime. 228 Both of
these decisions seem to set a complicity threshold far higher than the mere "do-
ing business in a disfavored nation" scenario feared by corporate America.229
Furthermore, the absence of bright line rules in the context of vicarious
liability is hardly new or confined to the Alien Tort context: as far back as 1984,
Professor Alan Sykes observed that the issue tended to be one of the chief gen-
erators of corporate litigation. 230 Furthermore, for several decades, commenta-
tors have argued that the absence of rules is at least as problematic for plaintiffs
231as it is for corporations.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court itself noted the corporate implications of its
decision: "A related consideration is whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation .... ,232 In fact, the only
ATS case to reach the Supreme Court prior to Sosa involved a corporation as a
plaintiff, at the time, the Supreme Court had noted that the statute "by its terms
does not distinguish among classes of defendants.
' 233
225 Id. at 640. See also John E. Howard, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-
Amok Going Global?, UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 2002) available at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0210howarditigation.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006)
(stating that companies doing business abroad are vulnerable to "a myriad of complaints.")
226 Koh, supra note 26, at 265.
227 Id.
228 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. 1T-95-17/1 'Lasva Valley' para. 249, (Intl Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber 11) (Dec. 10, 1998) (ICFTY Chamber), available at httpJ/
www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
229 Howard, supra note 225 (stating that "under current U.S. law, foreigners could sue your
company in U.S. courts -- if you simply did business, paid taxes and complied with the laws of a
foreign country in which those foreigners allege that an atrocity occurred").
230 Alan Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231(1984) ("H-ier-
archy and delegation are so pervasive in modem business relationships that a staggering number
of legal disputes directly or indirectly involve rules of vicarious liability.").
231 See, e.g., Mark P. Jacobsen, Comment, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in
Paraguay?, 69 GEO. L.J. 833, 834, 847-48 (1981) (describing the "amorphous law of nations" and
noting that ATS jurisdiction is "restricted... by difficulty in defining when an act is governed by
the law of nations").
232 Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 754 n.20 (2004).
233 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
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Some pre-Sosa lower courts have had no difficulty extrapolating under-
lying principles to hold that ATS liability can attach to corporations. 234 They
read international law to incorporate principles of corporate liability. 235 Their
reasoning was that accomplice liability is a feature of international law and
could thus generate a cause of action under the ATS.236 This view seemed to be
gaining traction. 237 If liability can be premised against principals on this basis,
extending it to cover corporations that allegedly expedited or assisted in the
abuses would be a logical extension.23 8 Since Sosa, at least some lower courts
have proceeded far more gingerly: they see the extension as an expansion of the
basic jurisdiction conferred by the ATS and see such an expansion as incom-
patible with Sosa's cautionary tone.
239
In either view, however, it seems unlikely that even the most capricious
court would, as some commentators fear, hold a corporation responsible simply
for doing business in, or paying taxes to, a disfavored country. 24° Whatever the
level of involvement required, corporations tend to be sued for some causal
nexus with specific atrocities, not simply doing business in an unsavory local-
ity. 24 1 Critics warn that this uneven approach will eventually direct all ATS liti-
gation to the most favorable courts, leaving corporate defendants vulnerable to
suits in the most unfriendly jurisdictions:
In ATS litigation, lower federal courts have unfortunately
adopted a mix and match approach to the choice of law (some
choosing standards from the law of the foreign forum, some
234 See Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
235 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[A] considerable body of United States and international precedent indicates
that corporations may be liable for violations of international law ... ").
236 Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Bodner v. Banque
Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
237 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d. 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving jury
instructions establishing against the estate of President Marcos if he "aided" the Phillipine military
in its abuses). Accord Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic
v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
238 David I. Becker, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
183, 194, n. 103 (1998) (noting that "the first use of the ATCA by a foreign national as a means of
asserting a claim against a U.S. company for 'vicarious' human rights violations committed
abroad is found in Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988)").
239 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(finding that international law is not explicit on the subject of the abettor liability and noting "ad-
monition in Sosa that Congress should be deferred to with respect to innovative interpretations of
that statute").
240 Howard, supra note 225. But see Fuks, supra note 143, at 141 n.210 ("The limitations on
ATCA suits that courts have developed and Sosa has underscored have clearly created meaningful
roadblocks to most of the liabilities from ATCA through purely business activities.").
241 Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 41.
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from U.S. law, some from international law, and some from all
three). Unchecked, this flexible approach will certainly encour-
age forum shopping as plaintiffs seek the most friendly federal
courts.
2 4 2
Forum shopping, of course, is hardly a novel innovation, or confined to
alien litigants - Judge J. Skelly Wright famously referred to it as a "national
legal pastime.' '243 Prudent defense counsel engage in their own versions of
savvy jurisdiction shopping. 244 But as Professor Juenger,
245 and federal courts 246
have noted, it is neither surprising nor intrinsically evil for litigants to jockey to
position themselves in the most favorable venue possible.247
The bottom line may simply be that U.S. courts have devices to deal
with litigants who attempt to misuse the system; Dean Koh, one of the promi-
nent experts in ATS litigation, argues that courts have used these effectively and
should be continued to allow to use them. 248 The alternative, closing the court-
house doors to alien tort victims, would seem to be throwing out the baby of
meritorious cases with the dirty bathwater of nuisance suits.
242 Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 78.
243 Judge J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 317, 333 (1967).
244 George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping--Why Doesn't a Conservative Court
Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 653 (1993) (noting that defendants have procedurals
devices of their own to obtain favorable forums). See also Charles B. Camp, Advocates Hope To
Pass the "Big Four" Tort Reforms, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1995, at 1OH.
245 Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TuL. L. REv. 553,
571 (1989) (noting that forum shopping "is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a
plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can
be most favourably presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation").
246 Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) ("There is nothing inherently
evil about forum-shopping.").
247 Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REv. 333, 395 (2006) ("Forum shopping is
not a form of 'cheating' by those who refuse to play by the rules .... [tihe availability of more
than one legally-authorized forum results in legitimate choice .... [slelecting the most favorable
forum is a rational strategy under law and economics' rational choice theory and game theory.").
2 Koh, supra note 122, at 2382 ("Rather than applying overbroad rules that treat all transna-
tional public law cases as inherently unfit for domestic adjudication, courts should target their
concerns by applying those doctrines that have been specifically tailored to address them.").
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V. INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFENSES UNDER THE STATUTE
A. Conventional Defenses
"No suit has yet been decided against a corporation, and a wide
variety of substantive and procedural obstacles stand in their
[plaintiffs'] way."2 49
Since Unocal, no corporate defendant has lost in an ATS action.250 Even
Unocal, perhaps the strongest ATS suit ever brought, settled out of court rather
than proceeding to a final judgment. Several prudential considerations - the act
of state doctrine,5  principles of international comity, foreign policy concerns2
and the political question doctrine - bar the ATS litigant's access to his day in
federal court. 3
Furthermore, Professor Stephens notes that that all the ordinary de-
fenses potentially available in other tort actions - standing, sovereign immu-
nity, 254 the statute of limitations, 25 and forum non conveniens 6 remain avail-
able, and many ATS suits have foundered on their shoals. z5 Forum non conven-
iens tends to be particularly efficacious in ATS cases because under the terms of
249 Gregory Tzeutschler, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 359, 418 (1999).
250 Claudia T. Salazar, Note, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United States:
Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable in the United States for International Human
Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111, 138
(2004).
251 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-26 (1964) (outlining the scope
of the act of state doctrine, which bars courts from inquiring as to the propriety of acts of foreign
sovereign within its own territory).
22 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting a possible limitation to an
ATS suit would be deference to the political branches regarding foreign policy concerns and citing
the South African apartheid litigation cases of one such instance).
253 Logan Michael Breed, Note, Regulating Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New Approach
to Corporate liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1020 (2002).
254 BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 126 (1996) (suits against foreign states rarely fall within the FSIA exceptions).
25 The federal courts have held that federal law requires the use of the most closely analogous
statute of limitations when federal interests are paramount. Finding that the ATS presents such a
scenario, the courts have sought for the most closely analogous statute of limitations, and at least
some have held that the Torture Victims Protection Act provides the applicable limits. See, e.g.,
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Reed v. United
Transp. Union 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The only Court of Appeals case apparently on point
also borrows the TVPA's ten-year bar. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
256 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981)).
257 Stephens, supra note 123, at 176.
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the statute the plaintiff must be an alien, and thus uniquely vulnerable to this
procedural device.
Though the jurisprudence is unclear on whether aliens are required to
exhaust their remedies in their home country, forum non convenience analysis
frequently imposes such a de facto requirement. 258 Under this traditional analy-
sis, if any remedy at all is available to plaintiffs in their home country, the case
should be dismissed, perhaps provisionally.259 The Torture Victim Protection
Act (TVPA) does include such an exhaustion requirement.26
Because Sosa has pointed to the TVPA as an exemplar of ATS enabling
legislation and pointedly suggested more Congressional action in the area, it is
likely that such an exhaustion restriction may eventually be embedded in ATS
litigation. 26' It is noteworthy that the most recent attempt to amend the Alien
Tort Statute in the wake of Sosa - Senator Feinstein's "Alien Tort Statute Re-
form Act" - included precisely such a provision.
262
Even assuming jurisdiction is available, the very international nature of
ATS litigation means that service of process may need to be obtained abroad, a
cumbersome and costly enterprise.263 Carrying the burden of proof under such
circumstances can be extremely difficult. 264 It is noteworthy that courts have not
been hesitant to impose Rule 11265 sanctions on ATS attorneys, 266 a develop-
ment that one commentator complained casts a "serious chilling effect" in hu-
man rights legislation. 267 No less an authority than Dean Koh of the Yale Law
258 K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEXAs INT'L L.J. 1,
19-20 (2004).
259 Id. at 19. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
260 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(b)(2003).
261 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692, 731(2004) (noting that "we would welcome any
congressional guidance" and pointing to the TVPA as implying Congressional approval of ATS
litigation). Courts have also "borrowed" the TVPA's statute of limitations in ATS suits. See supra
note 255 and accompanying text.
262 S-1874, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) available at http:/thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c 109:S. 1874.IS: last visited Mar. 3, 2006.
263 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (f) (covering service of process and personal jurisdiction issues for
individuals abroad, and referring to the need to conform to international requirements, including
the Hague Convention); 4A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1133-1136 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995). See also Convention on Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20
U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (the "Hague Convention"); Phillip K. Buhler, Transnational Ser-
vices of Process and Discovery in Federal Court Proceedings: An Overview, 27 TuL. MAR. L.J. 1,
9-12 (2002) (analyzing the service of process under the Hague Convention).
264 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that
plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient underlying facts to support claims).
265 FED. R. Civ. P. 11
2M See, e.g., Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
267 Antony D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising from the U.S.
Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 706 (1990).
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School confessed to considerable stress while faced with the onslaught of gov-
ernment Rule 1 1 motions.
268
B. Cause of Action Defenses
The chief problem for plaintiffs is, of course, demonstrating a cause of
action. Courts have been particularly restrained in determining whether particu-
lar torts constitute violations of "the law of nations, 269 despite scholarly urging
to the contrary. 27° Factual concerns aside, proving a definitiye violation of a
well-established international norm is difficult even as a question of law. 27 A
threshold issue to invoke jurisdiction in the statute is determining whether the
alleged conduct violates the law of nations.272
Courts have held that alleging a breach of a treaty obligation or interna-
tional law is a prerequisite to conferring subject matter jurisdiction under the
Act. 273 It is important because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by
either party, and the entry of a valid judgment can be set aside by even the
United States Supreme Court if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction did
not in fact exist.274 In practice, even pre-Sosa courts have required that the plain-
tiff establish the nature of the tort, and that is must be "definable, obligatory
(rather than hortatory) and universally condemned.,
275
Even before the Supreme Court's Sosa admonitions, courts tended to be
restrictive,276 requiring that the torts violate jus cogens rather than customary
268 Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 483, 485 (1993) ("Shortly after we filed suit, the government moved against us for Rule 11
sanctions for filing a 'frivolous' lawsuit, and demanded that we post a $10,000,000 bond to pro-
ceed with the case. Rule 11 sanctions run against both the clients and the lawyers personally,
which gave us considerable concern.").
269 Breed, supra note 253, at 1017.
270 William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L &
ComP. L. REv. 351, 359-60 (2001) ("[Clourts should not substitute their own policy views for
those of Congress and confine the Alien Tort Statute to a subcategory of torts in violation of the
law of nations.").
271 Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Ac-
countable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1453-4 (2001) (noting the
"high factual threshold" to survive a motion to dismiss under the ATS). See also Beanal v. Free-
port-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. La. 1997) (affirming district court's dismissal),
affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
272 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d. Cir. 1980).
273 Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
274 Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. 126, 127 (1804) ("Here it was the duty of the Court to see
that they had jurisdiction, for the consent of parties could not give it.").
275 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 881).
276 See, e.g., Nat'l Coal. Govt of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345
(C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Jurisdiction under the ATCA may be premised on alleged violations of a jus
cogens, or peremptory, norm.... [e]xpropriation of... property does not constitute a jus cogens
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norms.277 This limited any colorable ATS claims to a miniscule minority of all
potential suits, even though the text of the statute itself did not contain any such
stringent requirements.278 This stringency might explain why ATS plaintiffs
often allege "a veritable cornucopia of international law violations. 279 Professor
Stephens notes that the fear of a tsunami of frivolous claims has not material-
ized, chiefly because of the difficulty of meeting the Sosa requirement that the
alleged tort constitute an established, not an aspirational norm.
280
In particular, the more exotic causes of action that critics had conjured
up - novel environmental claims, 281 alleged cultural genocide 282 or even lottery
payout methods 283 - have almost invariably failed .284 Courts have held the line in
requiring that plaintiffs must plead and demonstrate a violation of established
international law,285 not merely unsavory conduct or a failure to meet interna-
tional standards.286 Virtually all ATS claims alluded to by critics, pertaining to
novel legal theories such as the right to health or the right to sustainable devel-
opment, have been "dismissed for being beyond the narrow confines of univer-
sally recognized norms" which underwrite the "very limited scope of the
ATCA.
, 287
Though critics often cite "a lengthy litany of various unratified treaties
and conventions dealing with issues such as economic and cultural rights, and
the rights of children" that have been asserted in ATS cases, the only two re-
ported cases invoking such rights have been dismissed outright.288 In other
violation of the law of nations and, therefore, is not cognizable under § 1350."); see also In re
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
277 Breed, supra note 253, at 1016.
278 Id.
279 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
280 Stephens, supra note 71, at 175-176.
281 See. e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper, 343 F.3d 140, 159-72 (2d Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1999).
282 Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167-68.
283 Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissing ATCA claim predicated on
lottery's refusal to pay lumpsum).
2S4 But see Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1264 (N.D. Ala.
2003) (finding that fundamental rights to associate and organize may be actionable norms under
the ATS).
2M Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447-51 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting jurisdiction under
the statute over claim that the defendant had property that had previously been seized by Egyptian
government on the basis of owners' Jewish faith).
286 Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1995) (alleged failure to ad-
here to international banking standards not a violation of "law of nations" for purposes of jurisdic-
tion under the statute).
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words, the charges of ATS detractors can be recast from corporate defendants
struggling with exotic claims to the reality that the handful of such claims have
been summarily dealt with by the judicial system.289 This is a testament to the
strength of, not an attack on, the overreach of the U.S. judicial system.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Among the defenses rejected at trial were claims that the CEO
was too busy to be expected to know details of the business and
that no one in the company committed any crimes personally
but instead merely sold a lawful product with no control over
the use to which it was put. Any reader of today's financial
press will find both those defenses familiar." - Professor
Bratspies on the Nuremberg trials of German industrialists.
290
ATS actions against corporate entities are in a unique class because they
offer a chance of actually collecting; otherwise, even the seminal Filartiga deci-
sion was essentially symbolic. 291 Judge Bork would of course, deny even this
symbolism, opining that the stamp of judicial decision gives international activ-
ists a legitimacy that is not theirs. 29 2 This view fears that "unholy alliance of
imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law professors" 293 would
seek to create rights to "everything from the right to a healthy environment to
the right to organize and bargain collectively.''294 Professor Kochan, like Judge
Bork, sees the statute as a weapon of class-warfare by vigilante law professors:
"Perhaps more importantly, the creation of 'law' by a group of international
organizations, which produce statements of 'norms' and purport to speak for the
world, has fueled this development.,
295
More practically, there is little guidance for American businesses as to
what law would leave them open to an ingenious plaintiffs attacking, fearing
being "sued on such exotic theories as causing air pollution... [n]o one knows
what actions some courts may hold to be violations of the law of nations. 296
Some fear that Sosa was only the first drop in a torrential downpour of frivolous
litigation that will ultimately culminate in mammoth class-action law suits on
289 Id.
290 Rebecca M. Bratspies, "Organs of Society ": A Plea for Human Rights Accountability for
Transnational Enterprises and Other Business Entities, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L 9, 22 n.51 (2005).
291 Fuks, supra note 143, at 116.
292 Bork, supra note 18.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Kochan, supra note 12, at 240.
296 Id.; See also Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 81.
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the lines of the tobacco or asbestos litigation.297 After all, international law, like
domestic law, is an ever-changing entity. U.S. courts interpreting the ATS ac-
knowledge this evolution and tailor their judgments accordingly.
291
ATS critics fear that international treaties and covenants on civil, politi-
cal, labor and humanitarian command increasing adherence - more than three
quarters of all states are signatories - reflecting increasing acceptance and hence
credence in both international and derivative domestic law such as the ATS .299
One potential major source of change would be the acceptance of aspirational
norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 3°° as jus
cogens or even customary international norms, something that many academics
argue has already occurred. 301 The UDHR explicitly extends to non-state actors
such as corporations, 302 and establishing it as a universal norm could spawn vir-
tually limitless litigation.30 3 This could theoretically drive ATS litigation toward
the asbestos-like scenario that some envision.
However, the Supreme Court categorically stopped any such develop-
ments; Sosa explicitly and unequivocally rejected the idea that either the UDHR
or similar covenants can impose any legal obligations, particularly under the
ATS. 304 This should assuage critics who fear that jug cogens claims represent
. Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 81 (speculating that corporate liability under the ATS could lead
to asbestos-like litigation and the discouragement of foreign investment).
298 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that international law
changes and evolves, and courts must give interpret it accordingly); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1979) (same).
29 See Douglass Cassel, International Human Rights Law In Practice: Does International
Human Rights Law Make A Difference? 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121, 127 (2001).
300 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Supp. No. 16, at 71,U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http:/www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
301 Claudia T. Salazar, Note, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United States:
Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable in the United States for International Human
Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111, 143
n. 185 (2004). Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 45, 81 (2002) (arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is "now considered to be binding, in important part, if not in total"); Accord Hurst Han-
num, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 287, 319 (1995/1996) (positing the Declaration as "contributing to the development of
customary law of human rights binding on all states") (citing Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS
19 (1990)). But see August Reinisch, Note & Comment, Developing Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 862 (2001) (claiming there is no consensus that rights in Universal Declara-
tion represent established customary law).
302 See Universal Declaration, supra note 300, at art. 30 ("Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.")
303 Salazar, supra note 301, at 143.
304 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-735 (2004).
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only the thin edge of an ever-widening edge. Indeed, even internationalists pon-
der the desirability of setting up the U.S. court system to judge any and every
litigant who can be hauled within its ambit, on the basis of tenuous claims such
as violations of the UDHR.3 °5
Even before Sosa, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had
drafted official instructions for the U.S. diplomatic contingent that drafted the
UDHR, was emphatic that it was not, and never intended to be law: "As one of
the authors of the instruction that Mrs. Roosevelt [head of the U.S. delegation]
received from her government on this point, I can report that there was no ques-
tion in Washington or in New York that the Universal Declaration was not in-
tended to operate as law.
' 3°6
Despite oft-stated intentions and the prodding of the Secretary-General,
the United Nations General Assembly has failed to assert itself or shown effec-
tiveness in enforcement of law rather than perpetual deliberation. °7 Therefore,
despite its passage of the UDHR and ability to generate reams of other eco-
nomic resolutions and papers,30 8 the General Assembly's resolutions are not
binding, and any attempt to ripen them into law invariably generates intense
controversy. 309
The UDHR episode illustrates the solution to another possible concern
regarding international law. Through the "persistent objector" principle,310 the
305 Harvey Rishikof, Framing International Rights with a Janusism Edge-Foreign Policy and
Class Actions-Legal Institutions as Soft Power, 2003 U. CHL LEGAL F. 247, 271(2003) ("But the
critical point, and the one that should give us pause, is that the international defendant is hauled
into a U.S. court by a U.S. procedure enforcing either U.S. law or U.S. interpretation of interna-
tional law, though the international defendant often has little direct connection to the United
States."). This does not excuse the tortfeasor: "This is not to say that the defendants are not bad
actors, but when did the United States become the center of a global legal order with worldwide
jurisdiction, at the expense of the other international institutions of justice?" Id. at 271-72.
306 Dean Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 314
(1981). See also id. ("There was no serious consultation with the appropriate committees or Con-
gress, as would have been essential had there been any expectation that law was coming into
being. Indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt was given great leeway in her part in the drafting of the Declaration
partly because it was understood that law was not being created.") But see Anthony Lester, The
Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 539 (1988) (noting that
the UDHR was "greatly influenced by the American Bill of Rights").
307 THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 325 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
308 Id. at 917-941.
309 Id. at 269. But see Chris Bordelon, The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self-
Defense Under International Law, 9 CHAP. L. REv. 111, 131 n.152 (2005) ("Arguments that
[General Assembly] resolutions should be regarded as having no legal import even though inter-
national law was the subject matter of the resolutions leads to the absurd conclusion that the As-
sembly acted for no reason.").
310 LoRI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 101 (4th ed.
2001) ("[A] customary rule may arise notwithstanding the opposition of one State, or even per-
haps a few States, provided that otherwise the necessary degree of generality is reached. But they
may also seem to lay down that the rule so created will not bind the objectors; in other words, that
in international law there is no majority rule even with respect to the formation of customary
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United States can prevent the emergence of norms that it considers undesir-
able.31' Though critics charge that the United States has little control over the
evolution of international law, the United States has, in practice, tended to be
active at conferences, in academia, and in the development of state practice.
Other fears have already proved groundless. Professor Cleveland has
noted that the Sosa decision did not ignite controversy from foreign govern-
ments; by contrast, for example, state government's efforts to impose private
"economic sanctions" on foreign governments tend to generate a blizzard of
controversy and a flurry of amicus curae briefs.312 "If frivolous ATS litigation
were in fact proliferating against foreign nationals and industries and creating
friction with foreign states, one might have expected a vociferous appearance
from foreign governments in that case" 313 To the contrary, several foreign na-
tions, including the United Kingdom and France, have permitted suits against
corporate defendants to be filed for violations of international law, citing the
American experience with the ATS.
31 4
Whether foreign governments can sue as parens patriae315 plaintiffs un-
der the ATS is an open question.31 6 Precedent indicates that U.S. courts are ex-
tremely deferential to executive branch determinations regarding foreign gov-
law."). See also Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persis-
tent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) ("a state that has persistently
objected to a rule of customary international law during the course of the rule's emergence is not
bound by the rule").
311 Stein, supra note 310, at 475 (noting that the principle can become important depending on
"whose ox is being gored ... the principle of the persistent objector becomes an enormously attrac-
tive means of protecting the ox").
312 Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society and Corporate Responsibility, 56
RUTGERS L. REv. 971, 986-7 (2004).
313 Id at 986.
314 Id at 977-78. See also Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability
Through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
451, 456 (2001) ("In Canada, Quebec mining company Cambior faced litigation over pollution
from its gold mine in Guyana; in Australia the company BHP faces claims arising out of pollution
in Papua New Guinea. In England, actions have been brought against Rio Tinto (at the time still
known as RTZ) arising out of working conditions at its Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia;
against former asbestos mining company Cape in respect of its operations in South Africa; and
against Thor Chemicals over mercury poisoning suffered by workers at its South African mercury
recycling plant.").
315 Parens Patriae is a common law doctrine enabling the sovereign to intervene on behalf of a
person claiming its protection who is unable to act on their own behalf of a legislative prerogative.
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
316 Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae
Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 COLUM. L. RaV.
408, 408 (2002). But see Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 337-39 (1st Cir.
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ernment access to U.S. courts.3 17 The Bush Administration has been generally
unsympathetic to ATS suits on foreign policy grounds.3 18 Past Administrations
tended to be more equivocal on ATS suits, depending on the particular issues
under consideration. 319 The Bush Administration's foreign policy rationale has
frequently, but not invariably, swayed lower courts.32°
However, the crux of the Bush argument - that such actions impact U.S.
foreign policy abroad - has commanded credence with the Supreme Court,
which recently struck down at least two state human rights statutes on these
grounds. 321 As a practical matter, considering that ATS suits often allege that the
corporate defendant acted in conjunction with a repressive foreign government,
it would be ludicrous to expect the foreign government to turn around and sue a
corporate defendant for the aiding and abetting of its own actions !
3 22
Critics point to the ability of courts to adjudicate cases. "If anything, the
corporate cases that have actually been decided reaffirm that the courts have the
necessary tools to distinguish non justiciable or frivolous claims from those that
are meritorious. 3 23 Despite the concerns of business, many of the allegations
presented in the suits are fairly serious and represent violations of law more
serious than merely aspirational.32 4
317 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978); Constitutionality of Clos-
ing the Palestine Information Office, An Affiliate of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 11
U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 104 (1987).
318 Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 CoLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 153, 161 (2003).
319 Cleveland, supra note 312, at 983.
320 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting foreign policy
argument).
321 See generally Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). But see N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren 92 U.S. 286, 286-
87 (1875) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions based on "the law of
nations").
322 This does not necessarily imply that a successor government would not avail itself of the
ATS mechanism. But in such instances, the doors of U.S. courts open to foreign governments only
at the sufferance of the U.S. government. See Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d
332, 337-39 (1st Cir. 2000) (generally, only domestic states may intervene as parens patriae).
323 Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique To Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and
the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2241, 2284
(2004).
324 See, e.g., Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Note, Corporate Responsibility Now: Profit at the
Expense of Human Rights with Exemption from Liability? 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 191,
191-92 (1999) ("Treated as slaves, [workers for the sued companies] suffer emotional and physi-
cal abuse, including harassment, beatings, forced abortions, [and] serious injury... surrounded by
inward facing barbwire, harassed and regulated by armed guards, emergency exit doors locked,
water and bathroom breaks denied.").
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In particular, the expense and effort entailed in litigating an ATS case
required "that it be viewed as an extraordinary remedy., 325 Indeed, despite the
fears326 of ATS critics, there is little evidence that the suits are curtailing corpo-
rate activity abroad; Shell and Chevron both announced extensive investment in
Nigeria despite ATS suits being filed against them for activities there.327
Still, valid concerns persist for what ATS litigation might portend for
the future. Indeed, more than one commentator has posited ATS litigation today
to tobacco litigation two decades ago; despite a ceaseless series of victories in
court, a single reversal broke the dam. 328 A similar scenario might conceivably
play out in the ATS context and unleash a torrent of cases in a story whose final
chapter has yet to be written.329 One lingering question-mark, for instance, is
alluded to in Sosa: potential action by Congress.30 In the wake of Sabbatino,
for instance, Congress intervened by passing the "Hickenhooper Amend-
ment., 331 As Senator Feinstein's efforts above indicate, Congress, as well as the
federal courts, stand ready and able to thwart an unwarranted profusion of ATS
litigation.
Though some would argue that ATS litigation represents a U.S. effort to
make law for the whole world, 332 it may simply reflect the fact that in an in-
creasingly connected world, litigation, like politics, may no longer stop at the
water's edge. As John Donne put it 400 years ago:
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the
continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the
sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well
as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's
death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and
325 Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mecha-
nisms, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 202 (2002).
326 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 25, at 458.
327 Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 30.
328 Hufbauer, supra note 5, at 84-85 (fearing that snowballing corporate liability under the ATS
could lead to asbestos-like litigation and the kill foreign investment in the nations that need it the
most).
329 Koh, supra note 26, at 269 ("But of course, the sky might also fall in tomorrow. As Chicken
Little learned, just because it might happen, does not mean that sky-falling is a likely scenario,
particularly when prudent federal judges are properly managing their dockets.").
330 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731(2004) (noting that "we would welcome any
congressional guidance" and pointing to the TVPA as implying Congressional approval of ATS
litigation).
331 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2006). See J. Anthony Kline, An Examination of the Competence of
National Courts to Prescribe and Apply International Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1
U.S.F.L. REv. 49, 56-100 (1966).
332 Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Buchanan v. Rucker, (1808) 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546,
547 ("Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?").
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therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for
thee.333
333 John Donne, Meditation, XVII, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGUSH LrrERATURE 1108-
09 (4th ed. 1979).
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